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THE IDEOLOGICAL PREMISES OF ·~J:SSTERN RESEARCH 
IN THE FIELD OF POPULATION POLICY 
by 
Pierre Pradervand 
A.F.S.C. Representative for Family Planning 
and Population Education in West Afri:~a* 
1. Necessity of an ep1stemological critique. 
Anyone even mildly familiar with we~tern.literature in the field of 
population policy·cannot help but be struck' by the extent to whicll. idea-· 
logy, most often neo~lVIalthusian )} , perme·ates most ~f the thinking; this 
usually is covered up by a veneer of scientific language which peels off 
easily when apj)roached epistemologically~ As the introductory quote from 
My-Edal stresses, this tendency represents a fairly general bias common to 
almost all knowledgE'. y. These ideological lJ biases could be considered .. 
simply as one more example of the folklore of academia if they did not have 
serious and far-reaching practical and political impli0ations; for example, 
the a.n:empt of some western nations and organizations tc impose a neo-
althtisiarr view of the development process on the Third World. In this 
._;,,aper, I will attempt to outline the "right" steps in the scientific 
approach to a problem, und to illustrate briefly how these steps are 
generally ignored in the field of population. 1/ 
2. Analysis of words and concepts 
Social scientists and demographers frequently use everyday words, giving 
them a supposedly scientific meaning. :Because they rarely bother to analyze 
· the:~·-wdrds and concepts they use and to,., ,..ften haphazardly "borrow words 
already laden- with numerous connotations,. the result is simply to incorporate 
common prej'udices into what is supposed to be a scientific discourse. 
·An outstanding· example of this is tLe use-even. by the most prestigious. 
demographers - of the word population "explosion" to describe recent demo-
graphic trends in the Third World. The word is misleading:, giving the 
impression of something sudden, almost accidental, and discourages a care-
ful search for. causes. Such a search undertaken would reveal the main cause 
of this so-called "explosion" to lie in the economic and social distnrtions 
imposed ur·on the developing areas· by the colonial powers 2) . . When using 
this expression, an aut.hor even ni,:.maged to evoke the ghost cil' some demonic 
libido rampant in underdeveloped.regions, as J •. Robbins does in.his book. 
. Too Many Asians (a revealing. title) who writes,· "At the root of Asia's 
problem of population is copulation" (sic) §/. 
* The views expressed in this paper are the sole responsibility of their 
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More revealing still is the fact that the 1rnrd "explosion" is used only 
to des~ri be the population gro:1th of underdeveloped countries, never to 
describe the.huge increase in consumption of non-renewable resources of 
industrialized nations, although there can be no doubt left that, in terms 
of environmental deterioration and stress on the world's ecosystem, this 
consumption has exercised mucL. g:ceater strain than the population increase 
- of the Third World. 
Another example or this semantic fuzziness is the use of words such as 
"conservative" to describe people desiring. large families and "liberal" the 
others 1f: · the P..frican peasant with two wives and a yearly per ca:pi ta income 
of $70, who hopes for 8 children is a "conservative'', as opposed to the 
"liberal" who wants a smaller family even if. he has a higher income and thus 
consumes more non-renewable resources. Words become meaningless in such a· 
context, · Other ·examples: "over'' and "under-" population, optimum population. 
::'· 
3. Ile:~)ning "the problem" , 
The-very acknowledgement that something constitutes a problem is a 
value judgement. 'l1he definition of a situation, or a "problem" is of the 
greatest importance .because to a large extent it already implies the solution · 
whic:!:i will· be applied to it. A growing number of western. analysts of the . · 
ThiI'd World outline population growth as if not the major obstac],e to. develop-
ment, at least as a very serious one. Most of the·time, they are sincerely 
rnrp!'ised that one can contest this view - for, as G. Myrdal so aptly sta.tes, 
'Ideologies, to those holding them, have always appeared to. be s.imple and. 
indisputc..ble conclusions from obvious facts"§./. The fact that quite.a few 
African countries consider population growth as beneficial is overlooked as 
a momentary aberration which.can hopefully be rectified by the proper·dosage 
of western economic wisdom. 
Rarely are the main dif.:.iculties of theLle countries stressed, i.e •. their 
political structures, the quasi-colonial.d6mination of their economi~s by the 
western powers,-the institutional infrastructurE) legated by the prior colcnial 
po>rnrs: factors· whic.h are, by any standard., as important 11 if not more so, than 
population growth. Why then pinpoint population growth in defining the problem 
rather-than any of these other factors? There is absolutely no scientific 
basi:=; for thh, approach. Again quot.ng G. Myrdal, who has .. such a clear visio~ 
of the ideological bia'ses· oi' western research: 
11 
•••• biases operate th:cough the selection C>f strategic factors on· 
which interest is .focused and of assumptions about their role in 
historical .processes •. This selection of strategic factors and of 
o::.ssurnptio::is· about. their role remains ess;;;:ntially a priori hmrevcr 
much illustrative material is ~massed. It never is ••••. e~piricell~ 
verified or refute.ct. "· 2/ 
Recent history offers some inte~esting examples of so-called economic 
"take-off's" despite popc.L.tion growth rates of 3 per cer.t or even above ·(Taiwa:i, 
Alb:mic.., Ou te:r Mongolia, etc.) 1Q/, al though the neo-Mal thtisian school LlSU3.lly 
"explains ai,;ay" the first case as an ''exception" and." ,conveniently ignores 
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the lad two. _Using the accepted approach of the sociology of knowledge, 
the reason for this bius has to be looked for in the social and political 
backgrounds of its proponents, those who suggest that "less than five 
dollars invested in population control is worth a hundred dollars invested 
in economic growth rr -to quote the now classical comment made in 1965 by 
US President Johnson. In their short~run view, it is evidently cheaper and 
· :lJOli tioally more palatable to cut down on the numbers of those born in under-
developed areas than on their ovm consumption. This corresponds to the logic 
of the nee-Malthusian di lemma, as the dean of French demogrt..phers 7 A. _Sauvy, 
stressed many years ago: 
"With 8 per cent of the world's surr'ace and 5.6*per cent of the world's 
popuiation 7 they (USA) consume 50*per cent of the world's production. 
This consideration leads them,- if not to consciously slow down the 
development rf the underdeveloped nations, at least to adopt an attitude 
which goes in this direction •••• In other words, if there is not a 
rapid increase of the world production t"f raw materials 7 a_ccompanied. 
by progress in the use of these materials, the mercantilist policy of 
the developed nations competes with world population growth. It would 
only be coherent and, logical if, suddenly, the population of the under-
developed countries was, for instance, reduced by one half. W" - -
Another example, auong many, of- false definitions leading to biased 
conclusions can be found in many western economists' evaluations of the 
bosts" of family planning: -by defining the cost cf family planning as the 
cost of contraceptive services in Taiwan or South Korea, these economists-
manage to "sell" family planning as a "£heap" investment~ -gj Despite the 
obvious.fallacy behind their whole _approach, they only take into account the 
"marketing" of the product, the final cost of clinical services. But in-
fact, this is very misleading as the lower-the level of development of a 
country, the fewer the _number of "mo ti va ted" women and thuf:? the higher the 
cost of getting family planning adopted. In other words, the cost of 
promoting the ad op ti on 01· family planning should in fact be spread over-
the whole development process. I would go so far as to say that for quite 
a few African countries - the countries of the sub-Sahara belt for instance 
5 dollars in health development (such as malaria eradication)·are probably 
worth 100 doll&rs spent on trying to get contraception adopted by these 
v-ery high mortality populations. -
The theory of the demographic .transition is another exam I_) le of how, behind 
a facade of scientific serenity, evident bi~ses are operating. The theory is 
too well l:no1m for me to need to summu.rize it here. rr:here is hardly any 
"theory" in this banal inte.rpretation f'Jf events, apart from its pompous 
title. One (')fits main weaknesses lies in its ahistorical nature: it 
outlines 3 - 4 11stag~s" which supposedly have uni ve.rsal validity. F'urther-
more, it has a "technological" bias inasmuch as the inain causative factcr 
of the mortality decline in the Third World is attributed to the large-scale 
USEl cf cheap public health technic1ues. -WLat is more natural than to offer 
a "te_cnnological" solution to what is supposed to be ·a.n accident occasioned-
by tec.bnology? In the wo:rds nf one r:il' the world's foremost family planning 
experts speaking in -1964 (If the I. U. D., ''I do truly believe that this simple 




It is pc3sible to explain the demographic transition, however, in very 
dif.i:'erent terms from the technological ones outlined above. For instance, it 
seems clear that the rapid population increase occurred because the colonial. 
powers had completely broken down the social structure of the former colonies, 
and especially had not, until too late, mado an;y- signii icant attempts at real 
econo111ic development. · They created the motivation for hec:,l th care, but did 
not modernize the countries, which would have created a strong motivation fbr 
b'irth control, as happened in Europe des1~i te the unavailability of contra-
ceptives. The. advantage of this last explanation is that it lays the onus 
for the .responsibility of the so-called population "explosion" where it should 
really lie - on the ex-colonial powers, not on "neutral" elements such as 
D.D.T., etc. This mitSht not seem of overriding importance until one starts 
calculating the real costs of population control, defined not as the simple 
marketing of pills and loops but as creating also the whole mativational basis 
for contraception, in other terms, the costs of real development. 
4. -~efining concepts 
Having defined the problem; it is important to define with equal care the 
concepts one is going to use to approachit. No zoologist would attempt to 
discuss the characteristics of C!n animal without situating it carefully in 
the family 1 species, etc., to which it belongs, any more than an astronomer. 
would attempt a discourse on a given nebula without situating it on a stellar 
map, defining its type, etc. Why,. then, are social scientists - who by 
definition operate in a field of fuzzier and changing concepts - not as 
·eful? Having made a careful· study of definitions (and worse still, the·. 
--~:k of definitions) used in the field of population policy over the past 
years, I have been amazed at the semantic anarchy which reigns in this area. 
Demographers and sociologists of great prestige write on the topic of popula-
tion without defining it, sometimes whole books are written without a precise 
definition of the term. W Defini ti.ans are the exceph on rather. than the 
rule. 
Defining a topic carefully forces an author to state his various premises 
so that the Teader is aware of th,em. Tliis is hardly ever the case of contem-
porary population literature •. Most of the studies in this area have a 
decidedly neo-'Malthusian bias, in that the author usually discusses measures 
aimed at birth control, generally concentrating on the area cf family plan-
ning. Intended or unintended - and most writers in this area are so wrapped 
up in their western value...:.judgements as to not even be aware 0f their biases 
this resuJ ts in eliminating f:rorn thG discussion of population 'policy the 
numerous measures related t-::i general development which are certainly the 
most potent creators of "contraceptive motiva'tion", as D. V. Glass has 
pointed out: 
"Direct programmes for spreading the use' of birth control ar.e, however, 
only a small pa.rt of· tl:e action in which developing societies will 
require to engage. TLe largest part will have to consist ('f planned 
econo .. ;ic and social development - and development at a considerably 
higher rate than appe2rs to have been eviJ.ent so .f<lr. This will be 
needed because, without a'i1 improvement in levels of living, birth 





5o Elaborating a theory 
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Any ·population policy which wishes to at least attempt basing itself· 
on scientific knowledc;e implies some understanding of r,ausal relations in 
the field of fertility. and contraception: if we suG1.;est certain measures 
e.g. decreasing maternal allowances -. it implies that we have. some Qlear 
·evidence that maternal allowances are a booster +.o fertility. Do we? . ·The · 
1sad f;;ct is that there is as yet not even a semblance of agreement among 
specialists on anything that could pretend to the name. ~f fertility theory 12J. 
Yet, as G • .Myrdal has stressed: 
"'rheory, therefore, must always be a priori to the empirical observa-
tions of the facts.. Facts come to mean something only as ascertained 
and organized in the frame of a theory. Indeed, facts as part of .. 
scientific knowledge have 'no existence outside. such a frame .... Que.stions . 
must be asked.before answers .can be obtained and, in order.to make sense, 
the questions must be part of a logically co-ordinated attempt tc; under-· 
stand social reality as a whole. A non-theoretical apµroach is, in 
strict logic,. unthinkable. 
Underlying and steering every systematl.c attempt to find out the .. 
truth about society, .there is therefore always_ a theory: a vis:lon of 
·what the essential facts and the causal relations between ·them are~ 
This theory which determines the direction of research should alwg,ys 
be made explicit. The danger of k<.:eping the theory implicit - as 
unstated reasons for asking the particular questions that are asked, 
atld of organizing the findings in the way they are organized - is, of 
course, that it escapes criticism. 'KJ} "· 
In other words i we are working in this area on the basis of "implicit 
theory", hunches, intuition, incomplete knowledge - which inevitably come 
to reflect national or class biases, ethnocentric;: views of the world and 
other viewpoints ()f dubious scientific value. The habit of ttimplicit theory" 
is the reason why the field of population policy measures is such a pot pourri 
of ideas, from the nuttiest (like pouring sterilizing agents into the drink-
ing water of these all-too-prolific people of the 'J.1hird World) to the most ~ 
reasonable. l:§,/ Not only must we c :,nclude that there' can ·be no 11scientific 
population policies" - the expression is a contradiction in terms - but we 
must humbly acknowledge that we are operating on the basis c·f ·biased and 
insufficient data, making guesses in the dark which we can never check 
because the subject matter of our study is continually changing. 
We ·may put our inadequate data into computers and, with the aid of 
esoteric formulas, bring out "impressive 11 tables, much in the manner of a 
game, b.ut let us not deceive ourselves ultimately: even ·a uscientific 11 
ap11roach is a "biased" approach - in a very fundamental sense. For it studies, 
on the basis of material observation, what was or is, and then deducts from 
that what could possibly be, given certa1·n circumstances. · It might be 
al together better to start from an .openly norrnati ve standpoint: here is what.· 
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.._..lis has been the Cl1inese approach, and from the most recent information, it 
would seem this country - which only a few decades ago or .. · less was described 
in almost hopelesc; tflrms by the neo-Malthusians l8J - is in the process of 
becoming the first large country of the 'l'hi~d World to have started deoisi vely 
lowering its birth rate. '?2.J · If this is really so - and I believe it is -
then the implications are tremendous for popul2tion policy, especially as the , 
pirth control programmes in India and Pakistan, after years of effort, have 
failed to make any significant i.mpact on the birth r3te in the respective 
countries. 
6. Methodological premises. 
Methodology can be divided into two categories~ 
a. The basic methodological approach: by this I mean the type of view-
point used with respect to the problem, e.g. sociological versus antl;l.ropological, 
institutional vs. non-institut~onal, (social psychological, etc.) historical 
vs. non~historical, etc. 
. . 
In general, research in the field of family planning which dominates the 
whole field of population policy -. tends to be demographically oriented, tech-
nological, non-institutional and ahistorical. The approach is admirably 
suited for side-stepping some.of the mQst crucial-issues in the area of under-
developrl1€ nt, especially problems of s.ocial structure and change.. By concentre..-
. · ng on nice theories about_ "machismo" and "husband-wife communication 11 ~ Olle 
desteps the issues of the historical development of machismo in a male-
oriented, feudal-capitalist society. The methodology predetermines the results, 
and it is not surprising that talented researchers conclude that husband-wife 
communication, (rather than political change, economic development, etc.) is· 
the key to contraceptive adoption: given the basic methodology~ they could 
hardly have arrived 'at very different results. '?:1J · 
The most striking aspect of this· ap roach ·is its evident'"poli tically 
conservative bias. This:bias is ~learly seen ·in the whole area of 11communica-
ti ons 11 research so often aimed at convincing people .to adopt family planning 
by generous dosages of propaganda 'and· contraceptive information~- Thus a -
recent study cf very low-income inhabitants living in the worst type of urban· 
slum characterized by extremely higb. infant mortality, 'high unemployment, 
quasi inexistent sanitation, etc. aimed at defining how to get them to adopt 
contraception without any change in their env{ronmental cond'i tions. '?:Ji 
b. Technical procedures: if anything appears immune to value biases, 
it is the technical procedures used in social science. KAP surve;ys are one 
evidence of the contrary, i;e. how an apparently "neutral" technique can · 
dicguise a whole ideology. These ·surveys, based on western and thus ethno-
centric polling techniques, have; according to one of their main. promoters, 
a clear market orientation. Thus Stycos, a pioneer in the field of KAP 
surveys (!~nowledE;e Attitude and Practice 0f family planning) has candidly. 
acknowledged that "the most important function of ~,uch surveys is similar to 











goods and services, in this case for birth control. '9.J. One cannot help_ but 
question if such an attitude is really conducive to serious scientific research. 
Yet, there is probably no field of the social sciences today where similar 
methods have b0en used on such .a broad cross-cultural scale~ It is also my 
opinion that the attitudinal aspect of these surveys represents, from a 
methodoloc;ical point of view, exceptionally poor research, and a growing 
number of specialists are expressing their skepticism concerning the validity 
-of many of these surveys. Poorly-trained int8rviewers are sent to question 
rapidly and in a totally artificial s.etting illiterate women on problems they 
have never heard about before. The questionnaires are often written by foreign 
experts who know. little of the local culture, do not speak the local languages 
or dialects, and have ·often lived only a few weeks in the country. The results 
of such surveys tend to become self-fulfilling prophesies, and they nearly all 
show, in varying degrees, that the people interviewed have favourable opinions 
toward family plan1lin·g. : Their use. (one should almost write "abuse") in Africa 
has led to rather astonishing conclusions on the high numb.ors of African women 
"interested" in family .planning. Not one. single one of these surveys in .Africa 
·has even broached the problem cf infertili-ty. Yet, any person withmedical 
experience in Africa knows that many more women are preoccupied with infertility 
- in a ratio of 5 - 1 to 7 - 1 depending on the, areas than with contraception. 
By simply omitting a topic, these surveys thus convey a very biased picture of 
the real fertility aspirations of African women. 
The questionable scientific validity of many of these surveys does not 
rnem to disturb many people, and a knowledgeable- observer, after criticizing 
them.for this very reason, openly admitted what most people who have worked 
in this field already know; i.e., that these surveys, apart from their 
scientific aspect, are used as instruments of political pressure. "···· KAP 
survey results·, erraneous or not, have helped to persuade prime ministers, 
parliaments, and the tSeneral population to move in a desirable direction and 
have provided famil;y- planning programme administrators with 'justification' for 
budget- and programmes." '?Ji 
8. Conclusions 
.• 
All policy sug1:;esti C?ns are by definition ribiased 11 inasmuch as they 
represent value judgements on a particular situation, and population policy 
is no exception to this. 1-v11at is m.-..re pTeoccupying thou.e,h is that, by what 
is evidently no accidental occurence, the biases we have outlined above tend 
to all c._,ncur in the same direction~ population policy is more oi'ten tlian not 
defined as population control; . the favourite means of population control is 
birth control (euphemistically termed "family planning" most oi.' the time, even 
when there is little or no emphasis on the fa;;1ily)? obstacles to the adoption 
of contrace_dion are located mainly on the tecLnological level: higlier adop-
tion rates are, following a now well-known litan;;, defined as being essentially 
a question of better administration, more research, greater emphasis nn commu-
nications and, above all, t_he "ideal contraceptive". 
These efforts are, no doubt, also neoded, but to lay such emphasis on 
hese anci so little on the structural changes indispensable to accelerate the. 
·aevelopment of a strong contraceptive m0tivation? never even to allude to tho 
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trade r~lations·betwee~ ri'ch-and pciol,-'nati~ns by which: the rich 'give a·· little' 
wi"'th one l~and arid take_ baci< a lot _with ·the other; to 'make "population control" 
the absol-ute precondition· of economi~_ deVE!lopin~nt'J '?:5./ when lt_ is_ painfully,_ -
evident that pqpulation control· will do 'little or no good to countries with. 
corrupt or reactionary po1i ti cal systems, -or in a si tu'.C:t'ti on "of- ri_eocolonial _ 
aomination ;: or i-1i th such high levels. of mcir.tali ty and such minimal le.vels. of-
moderni-zat.ion _that people will· not _want to adopt bir~h: control;.' to suggest - · .. , - ·;, 
all these. things is at .best .an acute case of .myopia,. ,ffi1d ·bad-faith a.t the - ... 
·worst_: •. ·r:n the. long' run' .this:' goe"s. against: t:he' best inter.es ts bo'th of. the .. :·'·' -. -_.,. 
indu;:;trialized and underde'veloped ~ati ons' and is alre"ci.dy creating a_ backlash. . -, ; 
against ·family ·planning and/ or population control in- some nations~ - For 9 as_ .. :· :. 
_ Profe.t:!sor F. Okediji ·_said _in this_- same: ci ~y_' just over. a year agO_:_ .. __ ~ "-~:. -··· · · 
_;_·;,_~he: d:e-vel.~~-~~---~~:tion~,--_:·m~st. re-e~amine°thei~ '.ec~~omic anci--·id~~l~~-i~·al.:-: ·_ . _ 
' policies which also" contribute to the \mderdevelopment: of. the nations: ~-' ' 
-- of the 'l'hird World. Their ~nthusiasrii in financing· and organizing ·family . < :: 
.:::_·planning clinics_:in·mos·t·_of:the nation.~::ofthe:•Third World-will __ .be mis.7"_-_- .. 
'construed as· a political gimmick to' contr'ol ·the p:o"pulation_·.cif·_the "latter;- - ' 
--- · unless they (the ric.h nations)_ li beraiize. ·_their .economic arrangements . .- · · ... 
· ·-,with the developing countries." '?:.§/ ·_ :-· · -_ . .- --- .· : . . . ·: _ · . 
. ..: .. ' 
There are so many excellent and evide:rit~ llhumani tariariH ~~as;ons. to' aa:;·p·-c :_ 
family planrting that it baffles ine that __ ev.E;lri,'disting_uished social scientists>.-, 
i.ve to· go through. considerable intelle.ctiial ·gymnastics· to. try and press-cthe_. •• · 
1.ea or'', population: control on ·unwilling---.nat:l'ons ·of th_e 'Tl:lird World. _This··_mli-
not· advance_ their cause one- iota_,_. and" pr.obably will· retard it corisiderably_~ -
My feeling is that "populatioii- control'-': ifr.·:troi;ical. Africa wi1Ln6.t succeed. 
on a ·large· scale until a. considerably· high~i-.. level of development has be~n> 
attained. -Instead of clamor.irtg ·10U:dly for' a_ more rapid ad·opt·fon· of. birth:~-·>_: 
control .in underdeveloped countries' the .rich:nati ons ·--:which_- include the . :" 
eastern b_loc ""'.":should take. really significant_ measures 'tcrwardf:t: boosting_ -the.::''. 
-economic and social development. of· these areas~·· _This :would be the most•: ·_ .- _. 
important contribution 'to' the creation of t'he contrace'ptive motiv~tion . ' - :. 
necessary for the ad op ti on of_.'f a'aiily plan!iirig and; i~·.·a. l~ng term perspe'9:ti-Ve ,-' 
the most: valuable means_ of~ popu,lation contro_l ·conceivabie>t6da;y'~.. · · -
;._, -
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. 1. I tc;i.ke the 1iord neo-Mal thusian in a "'vroad sense, i .• e. implying that 
population growth is the main or an: essential obstacle to economic 
and social de_velopment •. (~ee il_lustrations under 4)~ . . ·- .. , .... ··.·· - .. -· . .. ' .. 
2. 
3. 
For a broader perspective on this issue, see the intrcduction to 
'Asian Drama by the same author, ·Pantheon, N. Y~, 1968 ,. and also . 
P. Stree_.te17-, _edit~:, Value in Social Theory·' .. Routl_edge,. London, J,9_58. 
I am taking "ideological" in. the sense ·.of representing the vested· 
· interests of one group 91:'. .. a. s_pec?::f~c · .'.'Weltenschauung11 (world view) .•.. 
Even the scientific approach· .can .become an ideology' but most -of._ :the 
· time it is simply charac~erized by- epistemoiogical bias· ( w ·iney,:.ta "Qle 
· component of· its materialistic-- basis).: ~ :. '_ .. ·: . • .. ·· .. : ._.'-. :. · · 
My definit:lon of these steps owes a great: deal to. the: excellent 'Qook 
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